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NOTES
HUMAN ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION - THE
MEDICAL MIRACLE AND THE LEGAL MAZE
I. INTRODUCTION
On December 3, 1967, in Capetown, South Africa, an historical
operation was performed. A specially trained surgical team
excised the diseased heart of a fifty-five year old man and re-
placed it with the heart of a fatally injured young woman. An
electric current caused the heart to begin beating, making the
"ultimate operation" an initial success.1
The effect of this operation has been a new awareness of the
advanced state of medical science. As this new method of de-
feating otherwise terminal illness is perfected and becomes more
commonplace, certain legal standards must be established to pro-
tect the several interests involved. To reach a possible solution
to the problems which accompany these medical developments, it
is necessary to examine their medical and legal aspects, the ap-
plicable statutes which are currently in force, and finally, a
proposed remedy, The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act.
2
I. THE MmcAL ASPECTS
The idea of transplanting human tissue from one individual
to another is not of recent origin. Although the veracity of the
accounts is not seriously considered, legendary heroes were from
time to time made whole again after members of their bodies
were lost or mutilated in battle. More recently, the tales of
Dr. Frankenstein and his famous monster entail the same motif.
Modern human experimentation in the field of organ trans-
plantation began about fifteen years ago.3 There is a natural
sensitivity to experimentation on human beings evolving from
an interest in self-preservation and the emphasis on the dignity
of human life in most religious orders.
As the law has come to accept death from risks in other activi-
ties such as driving, flying, and in certain construction activities,
1. TImE, Dec. 15, 1967, Vol. 90, at 64; U. S. NEws & WouLD REP oRT,
Dec. 18, 1967, at 63.
2. THE UMNFORm ANATOmICAL GiFt ACT (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1968) (here-
inafter cited as THE UmoRM AT) will be presented to the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform Laws at its seventy-seventh meeting in
Philadelphia, between July 22 and August 1, 1968.
3. 200 J.A.M.A. 187 (1967).
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so it may come to accept the risks of human experimentation. 4
Such experimentation may be divided into three general classes:
(a) practice of therapy when there is no generally accepted
form of treatment; (b) use of drugs or procedures on patients
for observation, not therapy, with a view to improved treatment
of sufferers who may or may not include this patient; and (c)
non-patient experimental subjects. 5 The medical profession will
have to rely heavily on a uniform code of ethics to attain public
acceptance, 6 especially in the second and third categories. 7 The
physician will be allowed more freedom in the first class because
he is attempting to treat the patient and any course which he
chooses could be termed experimental.
Once past the initial public reaction in the experimental stages,
transplant teams will find that demand for organs far exceeds
the present supply. Of the available sources, animals have
proved practically useless; live human beings are limited to the
donation of one kidney; artificial organs and parts are not yet
sufficiently developed ;8 the fourth source, the dead human body
or "cadaver donor", seems the most plentiful and practical
choice at the present time.
The cadaver donor offers several obvious advantages. The
hazards and discomforts which accompany the donation of kid-
4. Freund, Is The Law Ready For Human Experimentation? TRIAL,
Oct.-Nov., 1966 at 46. "As the law has raised up a right of privacy, a creative
innovating doctrine, so it could come to recognize a right of experimentation
on human beings. Social interests and expectations, if they are in fact justi-
fied, can expect eventually to be reflected in the law."
5. Id. at 47.
6. For a discussion of possible safeguards and standards which would pro-
mote medical and scientific research, yet protect the individual's dignity and
safety see Note, Experimentation on Human Beings, 20 STAN. L. REv. 99
(1967) ; Freund, Is The Law Ready For Human Experimentationf supra note
4; 186 J.A.M.A. 1065 (1963).
7. When there is a passage from theraputic treatment of the patient to the
use of a patient as a means to an end, the rule of thumb should require full
disclosure of the risks to the patient. Hyman v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hosp.,
21 App. Div. 2d 495, 251 N.Y.S.2d 818 (1964). The patients were told that an
injection of cell suspension was planned as a skin test for immunity of response.
The patients were incompetent to consent because they were not made aware
that the cells were cancer cells. While no harm came to these patients, con-
siderable ill feeling for experimentation was aroused by this case.
8. An estimated 250,000 people have body parts made of silicone, a substance
mainly created from quartz. These devices include heart valves, "Pacemakers"
substitute ears, noses, jawbones, etc. Artificial organs would have three
major advantages over natural tissue; supply would be able to meet demand,
storage Would be facilitated, and there would be no immune response. U. S.
NEws & WOR.a REPORT, Dec. 18, 1967, at 62.
[Vol. 2.0
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neys from healthy living donors are avoided,9 and cadavers may
be utilized to obtain organs which, if extracted, would doom the
living donors to certain death. With the development of tissue
banks, the value of cadaver donors could be greatly enhanced. 10
There is one basic medical problem with cadaver donors-the
time factor. Certain organs must be removed from the body
within minutes following death to avoid irreparable damage
from loss of oxygen.': In this type of "emergency" transplanta-
tion there is a great need for legal clarification of the complex
problem which will confront the surgeon. Even with tissues
which may be removed more at leisure (e.g., skin, cornea, and
arteries) only six to twelve hours may elapse before damage
occurs. In this context the physician will be called upon to
make a legal decision; no time for a declaratory judgment is
allowed. A uniform statutory authority providing for the dis-
position of such organs would facilitate his judgment con-
siderably.
Another question which arises with cadaver donors is, "Pre-
cisely when does death occur?" Death may no longer be defined
in terms of cessation of heartbeat and of respiration though
they are universally characteristic of death. Artificial means of
forcing ventilation and stimulating heartbeat are employed at
large medical centers. By employing these mechanical aids "life"
may be sustained for an indefinite period. Among the more
important factors considered currently in determining when
death occurs is the state of unconsciousness. When all chances of
recovery of consciousness have been eliminated, brain death has
occurred. With all hope of recovery gone the physician should
not be required to support the patient by artificial means indef-
initely. Ultimately, the legal definition of death will be dictated
by well established medical principles. The modern concept of
death must be in keeping with the modern concept of life.1
2
9. Physicians currently engaged in transplantation are reluctant to accept
a living donor, because, due to the uncertainty of the length of survival of the
recipient, the risks involved seem too great. 192 J.A.M.A. 302 (1965).
10. Presently there are no banks for organs such as hearts or kidneys, which
cannot be frozen or kept alive for long. Certain body materials such as skin,
bone, brain membrane and corneas for eyes are frozen, vacuum dried, and
then stored in bottles which may be kept at room temperature for years. U. S.
NEws & WoRLw REPORT, Dec. 18, 1967, at 63.
11. The study of this problem in the introductory material in THE UNIFORm
Acr, supra note 2, lists the heart, liver and kidney as "critical" tissue which
must be removed within thirty to forty-five minutes after death.
12. Wasmuth and Stewart, Medical and Legal Aspects of Human Organ
Transplantation, 14 Cixv.-MAR. L. REv. 442, 464-68 (1965) (definition of death).
NoTs
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III. Tnm LEGAL AsPEcTs
The legal requirements for inter-vivos gifts of human organs
are well settled and the problems are few. Generally, the accept-
able donor must be fully informed of the risks and consequences
of the procedure;13 he must effect the gift by a signed written
instrument, '4 and he must be an adult capable of giving his
voluntary consent.' 5
Problems associated with cadaver donors are more complex;
to appreciate them it is necessary to trace the law of dead bodies
from its ecclesiastical origin through its common law develop-
ments to its present status.
Due to a natural fear of the unknown phenomenon of death
a rather strict code of sepulture has been followed since the
earliest of cultures. Because of the intangibility and the mysti-
cism which surrounded death, its jurisdiction fell within the pur-
view of the spiritual authorities. In 750 A.D., Cuthbert, Arch-
bishop of Canterbury, introduced the practice of churchyard in-
humation to England, thus, jurisdiction over the dead body was
at this time in ecclesiastical hands.' 6 At a later date, the ecclesias-
tical courts exercised control even of the manner of burial.' T
In early English law no recovery was allowed for disturbing
the remains of a deceased person, but the personal representative
13. Freund, Is The Law Ready For Human Experimentation? TRIAL, Oct.-
Nov., 1966, at 46.
14. For a suggested live donor form, see Wasmuth and Stewart, Medical
and Legal Aspects of Human Organ Transplantation 14 Crnv.-MAP L. REv.
442, 470 (1965).
15. A special problem arises when the donor is a minor. Even the combined
consent of the minor and the guardian might be insufficient. In 1957 the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts rendered three advisory opinions
(not officially published) which allowed kidney transplants between minor
twins who consented and were mature enough to understand the consequences
of the act. In addition to their consent, the court required that some benefit to
the donor be shown. They found this benefit in the emotional trauma avoided
in each case which would have resulted had the donor not been allowed to
help his twin. Note, Experimentation On Human Beings, 20 STAt. L. REv. 99,
107 & n. 46 (1967). Query: How will this affect unrelated donors? See also
Curran, A Problem of Consent: Kidney Transplantation in Minors, 34
N.Y.U.L. REv. 891 (1959).
16. Note, The Law of Testamentary Disposition-A Legal Barrier To
Medical Advancel 30 Thmr. L.Q. 40 (1956).
17. 22 Am!. JuR. 2d Dead Bodies § 14 n.13 (1965). No manner of burial
was permitted which would retard natural decay because "the dead [have]
no legal right to crowd the living . ... "
[Vol. 20
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could recover for damages done to the grave marker or the burial
clothes.18
The dominion of ecclesiastical control over the dead began to
be questioned when the corpse became a thing of value. With
the increased need for dead human bodies as medical schools in-
creased in number and in size, "the human corpse rose to un-
precedented dignity. It became a commercium-a thing of value
-to be bargained for and sold to the highest bidder .... [It be-
came worthwhile for men to devote themselves to the occupation
of resurrectionism." 19  The penalty for this offense was
slight since recovery was limited to stolen graveclothing; the
practice, however, was repugnant to the public conscience. Fin-
ally, in Rex v. Lyn, 20 the Court of Criminal Jurisdiction con-
victed one Lynn of grave robbing because "common decency
required that the practice should be put a stop to."21 Later,
English courts found that since a dead body could be the prop-
erty of no one it was under the protection of the public.2 2 The
recognition of jurisdiction in these instances indicated that there
was some "interest" in a corpse which the law would recognize.
The American courts, while accepting the later English view
that there was a right or interest to be protected, 28 were not sure
exactly what they were protecting. The authorities are almost
18. 3 COKE, INSTITUTES 203. "The burial of the cadaver (that is caro data
vernibus) is nudlins in bonis, and belongs to ecclesiastical cognizance; but as
to the monument, action is given (as hath been said) at the common law, for the
defacing thereof." For a subsequent elaboration of this concept see 2 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *428-29.
But though the heir has a property in the monuments and escutcheons of
his ancestors, yet he has none in their bodies or ashes; nor can he
bring a civil action against such as indecently at least if not impiously,
violate and disturb their remains when dead and buried. The parson, in-
deed, who has the freehold of the soil, may bring an action of trespass
against such as dig and disturb it; and if any one, in taking up a dead
body, steals the shroud or other apparel, it will be a felony; for the
property thereof remains in the executor, or whoever was at the charge
of the funeral.
It has been suggested that the "no property in dead bodies" concept which
was derived from Coke was a misinterpretation; that he was stating rather that
there were no property rights which the courts would protect. Comment,
Property Interest in a Dead Body, 2 ARu. L. REv. 124 (1948).
19. Note, The Law of Testamentary Disposition--A Legal Barrier to Medi-
cal Advance! 30 TEMP. L.Q. 40, 41 (1956).
20. 2 T.R. 733, 100 Eng. Rep. 394 (1788).
21. Id. at 734, 100 Eng. Rep. at 395.
22. Wasmuth and Stewart, Medical and Legal Aspects of Human. Organ
Transplantation, 14 CLPv.-MAR. L. Rrv. 442, 451 (1965).
23. It re Widening of Beekman St., 4 Brad. 503 (N.Y. 1857). The court
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uniform in holding that there is no property right, in a strict
commercial sense, in a dead body.24 Perhaps the most widely
used terminology for the interest is quasi-property light,25 con-
noting a limited right to custody of the corpse for burial and a
duty to see that the burial is properly executed.26
The burial right includes the right to see that the body and the
burial place are protected and free from interference.27 This
right, in the absence of testamentary disposition, at one time be-
longed exclusively to the next of kin.28 Modern authority is to
the effect that this right rests primarily in the surviving spouse
(if any) and secondarily in the next of kin.29 The burial duty
which accompanies the burial right has been characterized as a
"sacred trust" upon the surviving spouse or next of kin respon-
sible for burial.30 The person upon whom this right and duty
falls is considered the proper party to bring suit for damages
for interference with or mutilation of the deceased's body.8 ' It
is settled that the administrator, acting in his capacity as, such,
cannot maintain this action. The breach of any duty or the un-
lawful violation of any right which exists as to a dead body
is a tort for which an action in damages will lie. 2 Mental suf-
fering is an element of damages when it is the direct, proximate
24. 25A C.J.S. Dead Bodies § 2 (1966).
25. The concept of the quasi-property right seems to have its origin in
Pierce v. Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227, 14 Am. Rep. 667 (1872). Recent
cases indicate that the Pierce concept still prevails. See, e.g., Gray v. Southern
Pac. Co., 21 Cal. App. 2d 240, 68 P.2d 1011 (1937); Parker v. Quinn-Mc-
Gowen Co., 262 N.C. 560, 138 S.E.2d 214 (1964) ; Barela v. Frank A. Hubbell
Co., 67 N.M. 319, 355 P.2d 133 (1960).
26. Osteen v. Southern Ry., 101 S.C. 532, 543, 86 S.E. 30, 32 (1915).
It is the right and duty of the living to bury their dead, and they have
such interest in the remains as to enable them to carry the remains to
the graveyard, and give the remains . .. [a] decent interment without
interference from any one.
27. Id. at 541, 86 S.E. at 31.
28. In re Widening of Beekman St., 4 Brad. 503 (N.Y. 1857).
29. E.g., Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 50 N.W. 238 (1891); Simpkins v.
Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 200 S.C. 228, 20 S.E2d 733 (1942) ; See generally
Wasmuth and Stewart, Medical and Legal Aspects of Human Organ Trans-
plantation, 14 CLEV.-MAI. L. REv. 442, 457 & n.48 (1965).
30. Southern Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 21 Ala. App. 5, 105 So. 161
(1925); Boyle v. Chandler, 33 Del. 323, 138 Atl. 273 (1927); Larson v.
Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 50 N.W. 238 (1891); Pierce v. Swan Point Cemetery,
10 R.I. 227, 14 Am. Rep. 667 (1872) ; 22 Am. Jur. 2d Dead Bodies § 6 (1965).
31. Simpkins v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 200 S.C. 228, 20 S.E.2d 733
(1942).
32. Griffith v. Charlotte, C. & A.R.R., 23 S.C. 25, 55 Am. Rep. 1, (1885).
6
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol20/iss3/3
and natural result of the wrongful act; recovery is not contin-
gent on proof of monetary loss.
83
The right to have the body of a deceased relative remain un-
molested is not an absolute one. When justice requires, the pri-
vate interest must yield to the public good. 4 The public in-
terest often requires an autopsy, a post-mortem examination to
determine the cause of death. An autopsy may be performed
only with permission of the person having the right to burial, or
by order of the coroners" or the court8 6 in its discretion. Even
with the required consent, an autopsy which exceeds the permis-
sion granted constitutes a trespass.37 The permission to perform
an autopsy does not include permission to remove and retain por-
tions of the body longer than necessary for microscopic inspec-
tion and testing.3 In the case of an unauthorized autopsy, any
cutting of the corpse, no matter how slight, will interfere with
the right to proper burial. The recovery of damages for an un-
authorized autopsy is seldom based on pecuniary or physical
injury, but rather on the mental suffering that act caused the
next of kin. Although several persons might conceivably suffer
mental anguish, the right to recover is in the surviving spouse
or next of kin in charge of the burial.39
Concisely stated, the law today recognizes and protects the
right to possession of a dead body in a condition unmutilated
subsequent to death for the purposes of burial and preservation.
33. Palmquist v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 3 F. Supp. 358 (S.D. Cal.
1933); Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 50 N.W. 238 (1891); Gould v. State,
181 Misc. 884, 45 N.Y.S.2d 313 (1944); Darcy v. Presbyterian Hosp., 202
N.Y. 259, 95 N.E. 695 (1911), rehearing denied, 203 N.Y. 566, 96 N.E. 1113
(1911); Kyles v. Southern Ry., 147 N.C. 394, 61 S.E. 278 (1908); Lyles
v. Western Union Tel. Co., 77 S.C. 174, 57 S.E. 725 (1907) (recovery al-
lowed for mental suffering due to negligent non-delivery of telegraph bearing
message of death); Koerber v. Patek, 123 Wis. 453, 102 N.W. 40 (1905).
34. Kusky v. Laderbush, 96 N.H. 286, 74 A2d 546 (1950) ; Silvia v. Helger,
75 R.I. 397, 67 A.2d 27 (1949).
35. The right to perform autopsies is regulated and circumscribed by statu-
tory provisions in many jurisdictions. See, e.g., Division of Labor Enforce-
ment v. Gifford, 137 Cal. App. 2d 259, 290 P2d 281 (1955); In re Kyle's
Autopsy, 309 P.2d 1070 (Okla. 1957); Parker v. Quinn-McGowen Co., 262
N.C. 560, 138 S.E.2d 214 (1964); 3. RIcHAaRsoN, DOCTORS, LAWYERS AND
THE CounTs, at 185-86 (1965).
36. Drake v. Bowles, 97 N.H. 471, 92 A2d 161 (1952) ; Kusky v. Laderbush,
96 N.H. 286, 74 A.2d 546 (1950) ; Annot., 21 A.L.R.2d 536 (1950).
37. Terrill v. Harbin, 376 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. 1964) citing 87 C.J.S. Tresbass
§ 1 (1954). "In a general sense any invasion of another's rights is a trespass."
38. Palmquist v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 3 F. Supp. 358 (S.D. Cal.
1933).
39. E.g., Gould v. State, 181 Misc. 884, 46 N.Y.S2d 313 (1944) (surviving
spouse); 22 Am. Jun. 2d § 43 (1965).
1968] NoTs
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IV. PRESENT STATUS OF THE LAW
It is evident from the time factor involved in obtaining organs
from cadaver donors, that unless the law provides a suitable
framework in which doctors can function, the progress of medi-
cine in homotransplantation will be impeded. In order to
broaden the field of possible donors, it is necessary that not only
the surviving relatives be allowed to consent to such use, but
that the deceased himself, by proper manifestation, be allowed
to control the disposition of his remains after death.
The same "no property doctrine" that blocked recovery for
mutilation of a corpse proved to be an early barrier to its testa-
mentary disposition. In O'Donnell v. Slack 40 the court recog-
nized "that the individual has a sufficient proprietary interest
in his own body after his death to be able to make valid and
binding testamentary disposition of it."'41 One year later, in
1900, the California court ignored its prior stand. In Enos v.
Snyd&p42 the attempted testamentary disposition of a corpse was
invalidated, the court saying in part:
[I]t is quite well established, however, by those authorities,
that, in the absence of statutory provisions, there is no prop-
erty in a dead body; that it is not part of the estate of the
deceased person; and that a man cannot by will dispose of
that which after his death will be his corpse.
48
With the "judicial notice" of a property or quasi-property in-
terest in dead bodies, the reasons for disallowing testamentary
dispositions of one's own body began to disappear. The major
problem then became whether the courts would allow the direc-
tions of the decedent to prevail over the wishes of the bereaved. 44
In the earlier cases the wishes of the survivors were generally
given effect. Since the issue has become more concerned with the
40. 123 Cal. 285, 55 P. 906 (1899).
41. Id. at 288, 55 P. at 907 (dictum).
42. 131 Cal. 68, 63 P. 170 (1900).
43. Id. at 69, 63 P. at 171.
44. Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 207 Pa. 313, 56 A. 878 (1904). The question
was presented whether the rights of the living were to prevail over the wishes
of the decedent. The decision was favorable to the rights of the living, but the
court said that each case must be considered on its own merits. While leaving
open the exact weight that the surviving spouse's wishes might be given, the
court said that the desires of the decedent, especially if strongly and recently
expressed, should prevail over more remote relatives who might have the
right to bury the decedent.
[Vol. 20
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NoTs
public interest to be served than the private family disturbances,
the trend seems to be to give give effect to the testator's desires.45
In response to this concern for the public good, many states have
passed statutes which attempt to bolster the effectiveness of ante-
mortem gifts.
4 6
Though the states have begun to reflect the public conscience
through legislation, the lack of uniformity of content and cov-
erage do little but add to the confusion created by the common
law. This is not to say that some of the statutes are not well
drafted and effective ;47 on the whole, however, they serve as but
a starting point to finding a workable solution to the problems
as they exist.
One of the most obvious problems with the status quo of the
state statutes dealing with human tissue donation is the possi-
bility of conflicts of laws. It is readily imaginable that the
testator might prepare an instrument of donation valid under
the law of the state of his domicile only to have his intentions
frustrated when he dies in some other state.48
Practical problems with the present statutes stem from their
varied provisions and requirements. Most of the states which do
have statutes allow for the donation of all or any part of the
body, but some are limited to eyes only49 or a gift of the com-
45. Compare In re Estate of Henderson, 13 Cal. App. 2d 449, 57 P.2d 212
(1936) (testator's wish given effect); with Enos v. Snyder, 131 Cal. 68, 63
P. 170 (1900).
46. At present at least 40 states have such statutes on their books. See
Appendix I for citations to these statutes.
47. See Appendix I. It is evident that the statutes of several states are fairly
complete in their coverage of elements indicated. It should also be noted
that, it might be more desirable to have left out some of the requirements;
e.g., no remuneration (questionable public policy), delivery or recordation of
instrument (more complex administration).
48. Conflicts problems might evolve from the following circumstances sug-
gested by the introduction to The Uniform Act:
(a) X, a legal resident of state A, where statutes expressly authorize human
tissue donation, prepares an instrument which effects a valid gift under that
law. Thereafter, X dies in state B, where the common law prevails. (Assume
that under common law, the donation is not binding on relatives.) If the body
were considered personal property, the gift should remain effective, since the
law of the domicile will control, but it is not. From a practical standpoint,
since X is from state A, his next of kin probably reside there also; hence
state B would probably not interfere. Even so, the uncertainty of the common
law is good cause for apprehension in these situations.
(b) X, a resident of state B, (common law) dies in state A (statute ap-
proved donation) after executing a donative instrument in state A. The sur-
vivor's wish to take advantage of the common law of state B and they will
likely prevail. This affords no protection to the surgeon who acted in good
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plete anatomy.50 The prerequisite capacity to make an effective
donation varies significantly; while the majority requires capac-
ity to make a will, the age qualification varies from eighteen to
twenty-one or no age limit at all. Though probably the result
of hurried drafting, several statutes fail to provide a means of
revocation.51 Less than half expressly state that the gift is to
become effective upon death, and some protect the surgeon
only if he acts pursuant to a vaZidy executed instrument.
5 2
Another shortcoming of the state statutes is the failure to pro-
vide uniform definitions of acceptable donors and the rights
which the donors may exert.
In this maze of diverse legislation, both the physician and the
prospective donor find themselves in need of legal aid.
V. THn UxiFORm ANATOMICAL GIiT ACT55
Because inadequacies do exist in the present state laws on the
subject, the drafters of the Uniform Act have compiled a pro-
posed codification which will be effective if adopted by the
states.
To achieve minimum variance in interpretation, the Uniform
Act begins with a series of definitions of words pertinent to the
understanding of key sections. As defined, the word "state" in-
dicates the inclusive coverage of the act.54
Accepting the majority view that any individual who is com-
petent to make a will is also competent to make a gift of all or
part of his body to be effective after death, the Uniform Act
invites the conflicts problems which it seeks to avoid. The diffi-
culty here lies in the varying age qualifications which apply to
make one competent to make a will in the states. A better dis-
tinction would be achieved if the act read "Any individual who
is eighteen (or twenty-one) years of age and otherwise compe-
tent to execute a will ..
5O.Appendix I.
51. Appendix I.
52. Appendix I. The obvious disadvantage of making liability contingent
on the validity of the instrument is the necessity of an almost instantaneous
decision by the surgeons. Usually from the facts available, an absolute deter-
mination would be impossible within the critical time limit. Several states
do recognize the situation and protect the surgeon who acts in good faith,
pursuant to a written instrument.
53. Appendix II, THE UmNoM Acr.
54. Appendix 11, THE UIFORM Acr § 1 (f).
[Vol. 20
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Section 2(b) of the proposed act is drafted to eliminate cer-
tain problems of consent by defining the priority right of sur-
vivors when the deceased has made no disposition of his re-
mains.55 In such a disposition the donee will be held to have
accepted the gift in good faith only if he was unaware of any
controversy among the classes of relatives.
Section 3 specifies acceptable donees without being unduly
limiting. By restricting the purposes to what the bulk of the
population finds conscionable and by providing adequately for
facilities to effect these purposes, maximum public acceptance
and protection are achieved.
The effectiveness of a gift made by will immediately upon
death is set out in section 4 (a) : This provision is an absolute
necessity to an acceptable statute. The mechanics of preparing
an instrument other than a will signed by the testator and two
witnesses (all in the presence of each other, with certain excep-
tions) are set out in section 4(b). A gift so evidenced will also
become immediately effective upon death. When the donee is
named and unavailable or is not named, the attending physician,
to the extent that he acts in good faith reliance on a writing,
may accept the gift as agent of the donee and use it in his dis-
cretion.
One important innovation of section 4(c) is the specific ap-
proval of a properly executed card or writing carried on the
donor's person. It has been suggested that the card take a form
similar to an army identification card or driver's license, com-
pleted with picture of the donor and verified blood type.56
55. Appendix II, Tnn UNIFORm AcT § 2(b). Though well drafted, the act
faces almost certain problems in the area of determining whether the person
with highest priority is "immediately available" so as to pass responsibility to
the person with the next highest priority. For example, X dies in Z hospital
with his adult son at his bedside; Mrs. X is in a taxi en route to the
hospital. Will the consent of the son suffice? Logical construction would
give effect to the statute-the purpose is to obtain organs before they
deteriorate. Again the legal concept must be guided by medical necessity. A
physician acting in good faith on the best available consent at the time most
proximate to death should be protected.
Presumably, the "next of Idn" are included in the sixth classification. It
is doubtful that the guardian of the decedent, in the fifth class, who may be
merely a hired agent, should enjoy such a priority.
56. Interview with James S. Harvin, M.D., Associate Professor of Surgery,
Medical College of S. C., Charleston, S. C., March 22, 1968. The suggested
requirements of photograph and blood type are well founded; a positive iden-
tification of the donor will save lives and avoid malpractice suits. It was
1968] NoTs
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Throughout section I the requirements of the writing, the
protections afforded the physician, and possible utilization of the
gift are more fully spelled out than in any of the existing state
statutes. The Uniform Act also avoids the cumbersome require-
ments of delivery or recordation of the instrument.57 Complete
provision is made for revocation, explaining in detail the proper
procedure for the several types of situation which might con-
front the donor.5 8
The rights of the donee are defined in the Uniform Act, in-
cluding the provision giving him the right to accept or reject
the gift which is almost universally overlooked in state statutes.
To avoid a possible conflict of interest and to protect the physi-
cian and the integrity of his operation, the Uniform Act unique-
ly requires that the physician who certifies the donor's death be
unconnected with the transplant team. At first glance this might
seem a slap in the face to the medical profession, but in the end
it may be its greatest protection and a reassurance to the wary
public.
VI. CONCLUSION
The transplantation of human organs is a growing field of
surgery.50 A bill recently introduced in the United States
also suggested that including fingerprints on the identification card would be
helpful. Dr. Harvin poses the following problem:
Suppose a man carrying a wallet containing identification cards, one of
which identifies the man as X, is brought into the hospital with severe brain
damage. The card gives X's blood type and his consent to the use of his body
for medical science in case of his death. The card does not bear a picture
of X. Because of the severe brain damage, X has zero percent chance of re-
covery: he is the ideal donor. At the same time, Y is in the hospital awaiting
a replacement for one of his malfunctioning kidneys. The blood types appar-
ently match, so within minutes both are prepared for surgery; X dies and the
transplantation is completed.
It is discovered days later, after Y dies from the unsuccessful transplant
due to rejection reaction, that the donor was not X at all, but Z, a thief (hav-
ing another blood type) who had stolen X's wallet.
Without pondering the surgeon's liability, it is obvious that better identifica-
tion, through the use of a photograph or fingerprints, would likely have avoid-
ed the situation entirely.
57. Appendix II, THE UNiFOr: AcT § 5.
58. Appendix II, TH Umnoau AcT § 6.
59. U... NEws & WORLD REPORT, Dec. 18, 1967, at 62. Since 1954, twelve
hundred kidney transplants have been recorded at sixty-three institutions in
nineteen countries; twenty liver transplants have been recorded; on lung trans-
plant and, to date, at least four heart transplants.
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Senate indicates the importance of the issue.60 Though progress
is being made in the development of artificial organs, the human
cadaver will remain the primary source of replacement tissue
throughout the foreseeable future. 61 Realizing the problems
which arise in dealing with dead human bodies, the states can
avoid much needless litigation in the area of anatomical dona-
tions by adopting more adequate and uniform laws. The pro-
posed Uniform Anatomical Gift Act has marked advantages
over present legislation in any state. When the Uniform Act is
finally approved by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws it will be highly desirable for the states
to act immediately on its adoption.
For the law to serve a modern society, it must be adjusted
and amended to keep pace with new concepts; otherwise, it will
become a stumbling block in the path of progress. Oddly enough,
to provide adequate protection for the most advanced practices
of medicine, one of the oldest phenomenon of mankind must be
considered: "[T]he law-that rule of action which touches all
human things-must touch also this thing of death."
62
J. HAMILTON STEwAT, II
60. S. 2882, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). On Jan. 19, 1968, a bill was in-
troduced by Senator Jackson of Washington to provide funds to study the
medical, technological, social and legal problems and opportunities which con-
front the nation as a result of the medical progress in organ transplantation
as an alternative treatment of disease.
61. Interview with James S. Harvin, M.D. sutra, note 56. "With the
recent progress in miniaturization in associated sciences, such as the space
program, it is possible that artificial organs will eventually be functional. The
first artificial organ will, in all probability, be the heart, since it is in essence,
only a pump; next, there may be a workable replacement for the lung which
will oxygenate the blood. Due to the chemical processes of the liver and the
filtration system of the kidney, (present artificial kidneys are larger than a
conventional bath tub) it is unlikely that any substitute for these organs will
be made in the near future."
62. Louisville & N. MR. v. Wilson, 123 Ga. 62, 51 S.E. 24, 25 (1905).
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APPENDIX II
Second Tentative Draft As Revised January 2, 1968
UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT
An act authorizing the gift of all or part of a donor's body after death for
specified purposes.
SECTION 1. [Definitions.]
(a) "Person means individual, corporation, government or governmental
subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership or association, or
any other legal entity.
(b) "Body or part of body" includes organs, tissues, bones, blood and other
body fluids in the body of the donor, and "part" includes "parts".
(c) "Licensed hospital" includes any hospital licensed or approved by ap-
propriate authorities under the laws of any state, and it also includes any
hospital operated by the United States government although not required to
be licensed under state laws.
(d) "Licensed physician or surgeon" means a physician or surgeon licensed
to practice under the laws of any state. "Licensed Technician" means a medi-
cal assistant licensed as such under the laws of any state.
(e) "Licensed bank or storage facility" means a facility licensed or ap-
proved by appropriate authorities under the laws of any state.
(f) "State" means any state, territory or possession of the United States,
the District of Columbia or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
SECTION 2. [Persons Who May Execute an Anatomical Gift.]
(a) Any individual who is competent to execute a will may give all or any
part of his body for any one or more of the purposes specified in this Act,
the gift to take effect after death.
(b) Unless he has knowledge that contrary directions have been given by
the decedent, the following persons, in the order of priority stated, may give
all or any part of a decedents body for any one or more of the purposes speci-
fied in this Act:
(1) the suse if one survives. If not
2 an adult child,()either parent,
4 an adult brother or sister,
the guardian of the person of the decedent at the time of his death,
6 any other person or agency authorized or under obligation to dis-
pose of the body.
If there is no surviving spouse and an adult child is not immediately available
at the time of death, the gift may be made by either parent; if a parent is not
immediately available, it may be made by any adult brother or sister; but if
the donee or his agent knows that there is controversy among the classes of
relatives named with respect to making the gift, it shall not be accepted. The
persons authorized by this subsection to make the gift may execute the docu-
ment of gift either after death or immediately before death during a terminal
illness. The decedent may be a minor or a still-born infant.
SECTION 3. [Persons Who May Become Donees, and Purposes for
Which Anatomical Gift May Be Made.]
The following persons are eligible to receive gifts of human bodies or parts
thereof for the purposes stated:
(1) any licensed hospital, surgeon or physician, for medical education,
research, advancement of medical science, therapy or transplantation to in-
dividuals;
(2) any medical school, college or university engaged in medical education
or research for educational, research or medical science purposes;
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(3) any person operating a licensed bank or storage facility for blood,
arteries, eyes, or other human parts, for use in medical education, research,
therapy or transplantation to individuals;
(4) any specified donee, for therapy or transplantation needed by him.
SECTION 4. [Manner of Executing Anatomical Gifts.]
(a) A gift of all or part of the body for purposes of this Act may be made
by will, in which case the gift becomes effective immediately upon death of
the testator without waiting for probate. If the will is not probated, or if it is
declared invalid for testamentary purposes, the gift, to the extent that it has
been aced upon in good faith, is nevertheless valid and effective.
(b) A gift of all or part of the body for purposes of this Act may also be
made by document other than a will. The document must be signed by the
donor, in the presence of two witnesses who shall in turn sign the document
in his presence. If the donor cannot sign in person, the document may be
signed for him at his direction and in his presence, and in the presence of two
witnesses who shall in turn sign the document in his presence. Delivery of the
document of gift during the donor's lifetime is not necessary to make the
gift valid. The document may consist of a properly executed card carried on
the donor's person or in his immediate effects. The gift becomes effective
immediately upon the death of the donor.
(c) The gift may be made either to a named donee or without the naming
of a donee. If the latter, the gift may be accepted by and utilized under the
direction of the attending physician at or following death. If the gift is made
to a named donee who is not reasonably available at the time and place of
death, and if the gift is evidenced by a properly executed card or other writing
carried on the donor's person or in his immediate effects, the attending phy-
sician at or following death may, in reliance upon the card or writing, accept
and utilize the gift in his discretion as the agent of the donee. The agent
possesses and may exercise all of the rights and is entitled to all of the immu-
nities of the donee under this Act.
(d) The donor may designate in his will or other document of gift the
surgeon, physician, or technician to carry out the appropriate procedures. In
the absence of a designation, the donee or other person authorized to accept
the gift may employ or authorize any licensed surgeon, physician, or technician
for the purpose.
(e) If the gift is made by a person designated in section 2(b) of this
Act, it shall be executed by a document signed by the person authorized by
that section and witnesses are not required.
SECTION 5. [Delivery to Donee.] If the gift is made to a named donee,
the will or other document, or an attested true copy thereof, may be delivered
to him to expedite the appropriate procedures immediately after death, but such
delivery is not necessary to validity of the gift. Upon request of any interest-
ed party on or after the donor's death, the person in possession must produce,
for examination the will or other document of gift.
SECTION 6. [Revocation of the Gift.]
(a) If the document of gift has been delivered to a named donee, it may
be revoked either
(1) by the execution and delivery to the donee or his agent of a
revocation in writing signed by the donor, or
(2) by an oral statement of revocation witnessed by two persons, ad-
dressed and communicated to the donee or his agent, or
(3) by a statement during a terminal illness addressed to the attend-
ing physician, and communicated to the donee, or his agent, or
(4) by a card or writing, signed by the donee and carried on his person
or in his immediate effects, revoking the gift.
1968]
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(b) If the written document of gift has not been delivered to the donee,
the gift may be revoked by destruction, cancellation or mutilation of the
document.
(c) If the gift is made by a will, it may be revoked in the manner pro-
vided for revocation or amendment of wills.
SECTION 7. [Effect of Gift on Rights of Donee.]
(a) The donee may accept or reject the gift. If the donee accepts, and
if the gift is of the entire body, the donee or his agent may, if he deems it de-
sirable, authorize embalming and funeral services. The donee or his agent
may, immediately after death of the donor and prior to embalming, cause any
part included in the gift to be removed from the body, without undue mutilation.
The time of death shall be determined by the physician in attendance upon the
donor's terminal illness or certifying his death, and he shall not be a member
of the team of surgeons which transplants the part to another individual.
(b) The donee, agent of a donee, or other person authorized to accept and
utilize the gift who acts in good faith, in reliance upon, and in accord with
the terms of a gift under this Act, or any similar Act, or upon a document
carried by the donor as herein provided, and who is without actual notice of
revocation of the gift, shall not be held liable for damages in any civil suit
brought against him for his act.
(c) The provisions of this Act are subject to the laws of this state prescrib-
ing powers and duties with respect to autopsies.
SECTION 8. [Uniformity of Interpretation.] This Act shall be so con-
strued as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those
states which enact it.
SECTION 9. [Short Title.] This Act may be cited as the Uniform
Anatomical Gift Act
SECTION 10. [Repeal.] The following acts and parts of acts are re-
pealed:
SECTION 11. [Time of Taking Effect] This Act shall take effect
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